As a service to our clients, our office will electronically mail summaries of recent cases decided by Ohio courts that may impact our clients. If you have any questions regarding any of the reported cases, please feel free to contact one of our attorneys. 

 

            Curtin & Associates is pleased to report an outstanding verdict recently received by Ms. Kristen Lewis in the matter of James Buhaley, et al. v. Oleksandra Fartouchnyi in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. In Buhaley, the plaintiff claimed $50,000 in medical bills as a result of bilateral rotator cuff surgery. Four medical practitioners testified during the course of the trial and, prior to the trial, the offer was $10,000 and was countered with a demand of $95,000. The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $15,000. 

 

 

 

 

            The Ohio Supreme Court issued a decision following the certification of four questions of state law for review from the United States District Court, Northern District of Ohio, Western Division. The Ohio Supreme Court accepted three of the four certified questions. One of the certified questions dealt with application of O.R.C. 2315.20 which was part of Senate Bill 20 passed on April 7, 2005. O.R.C. 2315.20 modified the collateral source rule by allowing into evidence monies payable to the plaintiff for injuries unless the plaintiff was required to abide by a subrogation clause. It was subsequently determined that the plaintiff in Arbino had such an obligation and, hence, lacked standing to challenge O.R.C. 2315.20. Therefore, the Court limited its evaluative process to the two remaining statutes, O.R.C. 2315.18 and 2315.21.

 

            The decision is very helpful to an understanding of the nature and extent of challenges that are asserted against statutes predicated upon claimed constitutional deficiencies. As an example, O.R.C. 2315.18 could, depending upon the factual setting, result in a monetary ceiling for non-economic damages. 

 

            Several challenges were raised and are reviewed to better understand the breadth and scope of the underpinnings of a constitutional challenge to a statute. The first argued that such a limitation of a monetary ceiling for noneconomic damages violates a party’s right to trial by jury. Specifically, a plaintiff would argue that the ceiling imposed by the statute prevents the jury from fully evaluating all of the plaintiff’s damages. 

 

            The Court noted that a right to trial by jury is not absolute and legislatively imposed limitations could be acceptable predicated upon constitutional scrutiny. In paragraphs 36 and 37 of its opinion, the Court stated the following:

 

            “However, the fact that the jury’s fact-finding function is protected does not mean jury awards are insulated from all outside influences.

 

            So long as the fact-finding process is not intruded upon and the resulting findings of fact are not ignored or replaced by another body’s findings, awards may be altered as a matter of law. There is no dispute that the right to a trial by jury does not extend to the determination of questions of law. (Citation omitted.) Thus, without violating the Constitution, a court may apply the law to the facts determined by a jury.”

 

            Thus, the court found constitutional the application of a legally imposed ceiling on noneconomic damages.

 

            The second challenge was based upon a violation of a party’s right to “open courts” as well as the right to a “remedy” by operation of law. The Court found that the statute did satisfy those constitutional requirements and next moved on to the third subject matter of challenge which deals with due process.

 

            A determination of whether or not a statute is violative on due process grounds is tested by the “rational-basis test.” Alternatively phrased, if a rational-basis exists between the restriction and the policy that is being implemented in the law, the Court can conclude that a rational-basis exists and, therefore, the law does not violate the due process provision of the Ohio Constitution. The Court summarized its analysis in paragraph 55 of its opinion and stated the following:

 

            “The General Assembly reviewed evidence demonstrating that uncertainty related to the existing civil litigation system and rising costs associated with it were harming the economy. It noted that noneconomic damages are inherently subjective and thus easily tainted by irrelevant considerations. The implicit, logical conclusion is that the uncertain and subjective system of evaluating noneconomic damages was contributing to the deleterious economic effects of the tort system.”

 

Therefore, the due process considerations were met under the Ohio Constitution. 

 

            The next challenge dealt with equal protection, also guaranteed in the Ohio Constitution, basically prevents government from creating laws that treat one class of individuals different than another for the purposes of “equal protection and benefit.” The argument obviously would be that the noneconomic damage caps affect certain classes of plaintiffs thus violating the equal protection clause. The Court summarized the analytical tools utilized in its opinion and stated in paragraph 66 of its opinion, the following:

 

            “Finding R.C. 2315.18 to be facially neutral, we apply the rational-basis test. This test requires that a statute be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. (Citation omitted.) Under such a review, a statute will not be invalidated if it is grounded on a reasonable justification , even if its classifications are not precise.”

 

            In finding that there was no violation of the equal protection clause, the Court stated in paragraph 72 of its opinion, the following:

 

            “In that function, we cannot say that the General Assembly’s action lacked all rational relation to the legitimate state interest of improving the state’s civil justice system and its economy. The limitations were aimed at reducing the uncertainty associated with the existing tort system and the negative consequences resulting from it. The distinctions the legislature drew in refusing to limit certain injuries were rational and based on the conclusion that catastrophic injuries offer more concrete evidence of noneconomic damages and thus calculation of those damages poses a lesser risk of being tainted by improper external considerations. That reasoning withstands scrutiny under the rational-basis test.”

 

            The next constitution challenge deals with separation of powers. In a nutshell, the plaintiff argued that a legislative enactment limiting damages is an infringement on the judicial power to decide damages. The Court rejected this argument and moved on to the remaining challenge dealing with the “single-subject rule.” This is a technical objection predicated upon the fact that the Ohio Constitution prevents a bill from containing more than “one subject” which needs to be expressed in the title. The Court declined to rule on this issue for technical reasons but concluded that the foregoing legislative enactment was not violative of the Ohio Constitution.

 

            The same analytical framework was utilized in determining the last certified question concerning the constitutionality of O.R.C. 2315.21 which restricted the recovery of punitive damages in certain tort actions. The Court evaluated the same subjects (i.e. right to trial by jury, etc.) but concluded that O.R.C. 2315.21 was constitutional. 

 

            The case includes an excellent analysis by the Ohio Supreme Court of the competing arguments dealing with the question of whether or not a statute is constitutional. Inasmuch as this topic does oftentimes arise in the insurance defense arena, Curtin & Associates, LLP reasoned that a careful review of the case is helpful in advancing our understanding with respect to the type of constitutional challenges that are raised though legislative enactments that limit a plaintiff’s right of recovery.

 

  

 

 

 

            In Todd, the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed a case based upon a conflict between the districts and the salient issue was summarized in paragraph 1 of the Court’s opinion wherein it stated the following:

 

            “’Does a plaintiff of counterclaimant moving for summary judgment granting affirmative relief on its own claims bear the initial burden of addressing the non-moving party’s affirmative defenses in its motion?’ The answer to this question is no.”

 

            In Todd, supra, the procedural history was summarized by the Ohio Supreme Court in paragraph 8 of its opinion:

 

            “Appellees’ second motion argued that the trial court had failed to address affirmative defenses and that there was evidence before the trial court that raised genuine issues of material fact on the issues of laches. In granting judgment to appellees, the court of appeals held that a party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of addressing affirmative defenses in a motion for summary judgment. If the moving party fails to meet its burden, the nonmoving party has no burden to present evidence on its defenses, and the trial court errs in granting summary judgment for the moving party.”

 

            The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate analysis set forth above and stated in paragraphs 21, 23 and 24 of its opinion, the following:

 

            “Finally, our holding is consistent with the public policy in support of summary judgment motions. Civ.R. 1(B) states that the Rules of Civil Procedure ‘shall be construed and applied to effect just results by eliminating delay, unnecessary expense and all other impediments to the expeditious administration of justice.’ A moving party does not need to offer evidence on every defense raised by the nonmoving party. To impose such a requirement would delay the filing of summary judgment motions and increase the expense of litigation.

 

...

 

            We decline the opportunity to alter the summary judgment procedure in Ohio to require a moving party to bear the initial burden of addressing and negating the nonmoving party’s affirmative defenses. Our holding today encourages the just and timely disposition of civil actions by requiring a nonmoving party to respond to a motion for summary judgment with evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact.

 

            A plaintiff or counterclaimant moving for summary judgment does not bear the initial burden of addressing the nonmoving party’s affirmative defenses. The trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of appellants was proper, and the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s decision.”

 

 

 

 

            In Vaughn, the Ohio Supreme Court heard a case certified by the Sixth District Court of Appeals under its authority set forth in the Ohio Constitution and the certified issue was summarized and answered by the Ohio Supreme Court in paragraph 2 of its opinion wherein the Court stated the following:

 

            “The certified issue is as follows: ‘Where attorney fees are requested in the original pleadings, may a party wait until after judgment on the case in chief is entered to file its motion for attorney fees?’ We hold that when attorney fees are requested in the original pleadings, a party may wait until after entry of a judgment on the other claims in the case to file its motion for attorney fees. We also hold that when attorney fees are requested in the original pleadings, an order that does not dispose of the attorney-fee claim and does not include, pursuant to Civ. R. 54(B), an express determination that there is no just reason for delay, is not a final, appealable order.

 

            The case is interesting inasmuch as it rejected several other appellate decisions that held that a claim for attorney fees must be raised and presented at trial. Accordingly, this case is unique inasmuch as it clearly confers upon a party who has at least requested in the original pleadings a claim for attorney fees, the right to make that request after entry of judgment.