Curtin & Associates' Announcements
Curtin & Associates is proud to announce that Kristen Lewis delivered Hayden Michael Lewis on October 18, 2007. Mother and baby are doing well.
Substantive Law Supersedes Ohio Rules Of Civil Procedure
Proctor v. Kardassilaris, (2007) 115 Ohio St.3d 71
The Ohio Supreme Court recently handed down an interesting case which dealt with the interplay between substantive jurisdictional law in the State of Ohio and the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. The case arose in the context of a statute that limited causes of action against the Ohio Director of Transportation be filed only in Franklin County. A matter arose in Trumbull County wherein the Director of Transportation initiated an action against defendants and subsequently, the defendants attempted to file a counterclaim against the Director of Transportation in the same Trumbull County court case. Therefore, on its face, the counterclaim asserted in Trumbull County set the stage for the conflict between the jurisdictional limitation of Franklin County and the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court began its analysis by examining the history of sovereign immunity which is worth of review especially in light of tort cases that arise involving government entities. In paragraphs 7 – 9 of its opinion, the Court reviewed that history and stated the following:
“It is well-settled law that a state is not subject to suit in its own courts unless it expressly consents to be sued. (citation omitted). In 1912, the Ohio Constitution was amended to provide that ‘suits may be brought against the state, in such courts and in such manner, as may be provided by law.’
However, this provision did not provide specific consent for every state entity to be sued in every state court. (citations omitted). Rather, it merely enabled the state to pass statutes consenting to be sued in specific ways; unless an explicit statutory waiver exists, the presumption of sovereign immunity applies.
In 1928, the General Assembly enacted such a statute, waiving immunity for suits against the director of transportation but limiting such suits to Franklin County.”
The purported counterclaimants’ argument was summarized in paragraph 16 of the Court’s opinion wherein it was stated as follows:
“Kardassilaris and Blank next argue that even if R.C. 5501.22 requires counterclaims to be filed in Franklin County, Civ. R. 13(A) and (B) either permit or require them to be joined with pending actions, depending on the nature of the claim. Further, they suggest that these provisions take precedence over statutory law to the contrary. They support this argument by citing Section 5, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, commonly referred to as the Modern Courts Amendment of 1968.”
The Ohio Supreme Court noted that the flaw in the defendant/counterclaimant’s argument was that the Modern Courts Amendment conferred authority for the Supreme Court to create rules and practices for courts in the state but included a specific prohibition which was summarized in paragraph 17 of the opinion wherein the Court stated the following:
“However, it expressly states that rules created in this manner ‘shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.’ Id. Thus, if a rule created pursuant to Section 5(B), Article IV conflicts with a statute, the rule will control for procedural matters, and the statute will control for matters of substantive law.”
The Court concluded that the statute limiting causes of action against the director of transportation to Franklin County was a substantive law. Inasmuch as the attempted utilization of O.R.C.P. 13 would represent a conflict between the civil rules and the jurisdictional limitation, the Court concluded that the jurisdictional limitation statute was controlling.
Therefore, the Court did not allow the issue of compulsory counterclaims to supersede the jurisdictional limitation codified in R.C. 5501.22.
Arbitration Agreement – Unenforceable Against Beneficiaries
Of A Wrongful Death Claim
Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co. (2007) 115 Ohio St.3d 134
William Peters began working at his job but, as a condition of his employment, was required to sign an agreement that all legal disputes or claims with the company were limited to arbitration for adjudication. The agreement also indicated that such an agreement applied to heirs and beneficiaries of the employee. Thus, the operative effect was that no claim could be asserted against the company in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Mr. Peters, unfortunately, was killed eight days into his employment and thereafter two causes of action were commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction against the company, the first being a survival action for injuries sustained prior to his death as well as a wrongful death claim. The company moved to dismiss both causes of action arguing that the aforementioned agreement required arbitration of both claims.
The Ohio Supreme Court began its analysis by noting the distinction between the survival claim and the wrongful death claim. The Court concluded that Mr. Peters’ execution of the agreement did limit his survival action to arbitration but the same provision could not extend to the wrongful death claim.
With regard to the survival claim, the Court stated in paragraph 18 of its opinion, the following:
“When Peters signed the arbitration agreement, he agreed to arbitrate his claims against the company, whether brought during his life or after his death. Thus, the provision in the agreement binding Peters’s heirs, beneficiaries, successors, and assigns applies to a survival action, which is the vessel used to pursue his claims after his death.”
The Court, however, drew a line between the survival action and the wrongful death claim. The Court so held in paragraph 19 of its opinion, wherein it stated the following:
“However, Peters could not restrict his beneficiaries to arbitration of their wrongful-death claims, because he held no right to those claims; they accrued independently to his beneficiaries for the injuries they personally suffered as a result of the death.”
The Court concluded its opinion by explaining that it supported the concept of arbitration but not at the cost of divesting individuals of rights. In paragraph 20, the Court stated the following:
“Although we have long favored arbitration and encourage it as a cost-effective proceeding that permits parties to achieve permanent resolution of their disputes in an expedient manner, it may not be imposed on the unwilling. Requiring Peters’s beneficiaries to arbitrate their wrongful-death claims without a signed arbitration agreement would be unconstitutional, inequitable, and in violation of nearly a century’s worth of established precedent.”
Accordingly, the survival action was limited to the arbitration requirement set forth in the agreement and the family was permitted to prosecute their wrongful death claim in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Note To Supreme Court Practitioners
On January 1, 2008, amendments to the rules of practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio go into effect. Individuals with matters pending before that tribunal are referred to those changes which appear in the Ohio State Bar Association Report Volume 80, #43.
Curtin & Associates will continue to electronically transmit cases of interest to the insurance industry. Please visit our website at www.curtinlawfirm.com. For your convenience, we will post these cases on our website in the “Newsletter” link.
The information contained in this Newsletter is not a legal opinion and is for informational purposes only. Specific questions should be directed to an attorney for a legal opinion.
Curtin & Associates' Announcements
Curtin & Associates is proud to announce that Kristen Lewis delivered Hayden Michael Lewis on October 18, 2007. Mother and baby are doing well.
Substantive Law Supersedes Ohio Rules Of Civil Procedure
Proctor v. Kardassilaris, (2007) 115 Ohio St.3d 71
The Ohio Supreme Court recently handed down an interesting case which dealt with the interplay between substantive jurisdictional law in the State of Ohio and the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. The case arose in the context of a statute that limited causes of action against the Ohio Director of Transportation be filed only in Franklin County. A matter arose in Trumbull County wherein the Director of Transportation initiated an action against defendants and subsequently, the defendants attempted to file a counterclaim against the Director of Transportation in the same Trumbull County court case. Therefore, on its face, the counterclaim asserted in Trumbull County set the stage for the conflict between the jurisdictional limitation of Franklin County and the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court began its analysis by examining the history of sovereign immunity which is worth of review especially in light of tort cases that arise involving government entities. In paragraphs 7 – 9 of its opinion, the Court reviewed that history and stated the following:
“It is well-settled law that a state is not subject to suit in its own courts unless it expressly consents to be sued. (citation omitted). In 1912, the Ohio Constitution was amended to provide that ‘suits may be brought against the state, in such courts and in such manner, as may be provided by law.’
However, this provision did not provide specific consent for every state entity to be sued in every state court. (citations omitted). Rather, it merely enabled the state to pass statutes consenting to be sued in specific ways; unless an explicit statutory waiver exists, the presumption of sovereign immunity applies.
In 1928, the General Assembly enacted such a statute, waiving immunity for suits against the director of transportation but limiting such suits to Franklin County.”
The purported counterclaimants’ argument was summarized in paragraph 16 of the Court’s opinion wherein it was stated as follows:
“Kardassilaris and Blank next argue that even if R.C. 5501.22 requires counterclaims to be filed in Franklin County, Civ. R. 13(A) and (B) either permit or require them to be joined with pending actions, depending on the nature of the claim. Further, they suggest that these provisions take precedence over statutory law to the contrary. They support this argument by citing Section 5, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, commonly referred to as the Modern Courts Amendment of 1968.”
The Ohio Supreme Court noted that the flaw in the defendant/counterclaimant’s argument was that the Modern Courts Amendment conferred authority for the Supreme Court to create rules and practices for courts in the state but included a specific prohibition which was summarized in paragraph 17 of the opinion wherein the Court stated the following:
“However, it expressly states that rules created in this manner ‘shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.’ Id. Thus, if a rule created pursuant to Section 5(B), Article IV conflicts with a statute, the rule will control for procedural matters, and the statute will control for matters of substantive law.”
The Court concluded that the statute limiting causes of action against the director of transportation to Franklin County was a substantive law. Inasmuch as the attempted utilization of O.R.C.P. 13 would represent a conflict between the civil rules and the jurisdictional limitation, the Court concluded that the jurisdictional limitation statute was controlling.
Therefore, the Court did not allow the issue of compulsory counterclaims to supersede the jurisdictional limitation codified in R.C. 5501.22.
Arbitration Agreement – Unenforceable Against Beneficiaries
Of A Wrongful Death Claim
Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co. (2007) 115 Ohio St.3d 134
William Peters began working at his job but, as a condition of his employment, was required to sign an agreement that all legal disputes or claims with the company were limited to arbitration for adjudication. The agreement also indicated that such an agreement applied to heirs and beneficiaries of the employee. Thus, the operative effect was that no claim could be asserted against the company in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Mr. Peters, unfortunately, was killed eight days into his employment and thereafter two causes of action were commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction against the company, the first being a survival action for injuries sustained prior to his death as well as a wrongful death claim. The company moved to dismiss both causes of action arguing that the aforementioned agreement required arbitration of both claims.
The Ohio Supreme Court began its analysis by noting the distinction between the survival claim and the wrongful death claim. The Court concluded that Mr. Peters’ execution of the agreement did limit his survival action to arbitration but the same provision could not extend to the wrongful death claim.
With regard to the survival claim, the Court stated in paragraph 18 of its opinion, the following:
“When Peters signed the arbitration agreement, he agreed to arbitrate his claims against the company, whether brought during his life or after his death. Thus, the provision in the agreement binding Peters’s heirs, beneficiaries, successors, and assigns applies to a survival action, which is the vessel used to pursue his claims after his death.”
The Court, however, drew a line between the survival action and the wrongful death claim. The Court so held in paragraph 19 of its opinion, wherein it stated the following:
“However, Peters could not restrict his beneficiaries to arbitration of their wrongful-death claims, because he held no right to those claims; they accrued independently to his beneficiaries for the injuries they personally suffered as a result of the death.”
The Court concluded its opinion by explaining that it supported the concept of arbitration but not at the cost of divesting individuals of rights. In paragraph 20, the Court stated the following:
“Although we have long favored arbitration and encourage it as a cost-effective proceeding that permits parties to achieve permanent resolution of their disputes in an expedient manner, it may not be imposed on the unwilling. Requiring Peters’s beneficiaries to arbitrate their wrongful-death claims without a signed arbitration agreement would be unconstitutional, inequitable, and in violation of nearly a century’s worth of established precedent.”
Accordingly, the survival action was limited to the arbitration requirement set forth in the agreement and the family was permitted to prosecute their wrongful death claim in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Note To Supreme Court Practitioners
On January 1, 2008, amendments to the rules of practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio go into effect. Individuals with matters pending before that tribunal are referred to those changes which appear in the Ohio State Bar Association Report Volume 80, #43.
Curtin & Associates will continue to electronically transmit cases of interest to the insurance industry. Please visit our website at www.curtinlawfirm.com. For your convenience, we will post these cases on our website in the “Newsletter” link.
The information contained in this Newsletter is not a legal opinion and is for informational purposes only. Specific questions should be directed to an attorney for a legal opinion.