Curtin & Associates, LLP
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As a service to our clients, our office will electronically mail summaries of recent cases decided by Ohio courts that may impact our clients.  If you have any questions regarding any of the reported cases, please feel free to contact one of our attorneys. 

 


As a service to our clients, our office will electronically mail summaries of recent cases decided by Ohio courts that may impact our clients.  If you have any questions regarding any of the reported cases, please feel free to contact one of our attorneys. 

 

August 2007

Trial Updates

            Curtin & Associates is pleased to review significant jury trials recently completed by our office:

            G. Michael Curtin completed a week long jury trial representing the CEO of a corporation in a lawsuit filed by the former president of the same corporation.  Upon retirement, the outgoing president had argued the CEO failed to make monetary distributions to him sufficient to cover tax liability derivative of his ownership of Sub-chapter S stock in the company.  The demand for resolution was $330,000 and the jury returned an unanimous defense verdict in favor of the CEO.  For privacy considerations, the names of the participants as well as the company have been omitted from this description.

 

Expert Witness – Scope of Testimony

Davis v. Killing, (2007) 171 Ohio App.3d 400:

            The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident wherein plaintiff was traveling west on Route 422 attempting to make a left hand turn and was struck by the defendant who was heading east on Route 422.  The central dispute at issue dealt with who had the green light/green arrow.  The plaintiff presented testimony from her treating physician for the purposes of demonstrating that the motor vehicle accident has worsened her pre-existing multiple sclerosis.  However, testimony was also adduced that the plaintiff had been seen on the day of the accident (prior to the collision) by the same doctor and had described prior episodes of feeling sleepy and having trouble staying awake while talking or driving. 

            The plaintiff objected to this testimony noting that the admission of it would be highly prejudicial.  The court noted in its analysis that the label “prejudicial” is not dispositive of the determination of admissibility.  In paragraphs 15 and 16, the court stated the following:

            “At the outset, we note that the evidence relating to the physical complaints and symptoms appellant had told her treating physician about on the day of the accident (her eye/sleep disorder) must be deemed relevant since these conditions could have potentially affected her vision and driving capabilities.  We must next determine whether such evidence was prejudicial and should have been excluded under Evid.R. 403.

            Appellant argues that the inclusion of this evidence was prejudicial and an abuse of discretion.  However, ‘exclusion on the basis of unfair prejudice involves more than a balance of mere prejudice.  If unfair prejudice simply meant prejudice, anything adverse to a litigant’s case would be excludable under (Evid.R.) 403.  Emphasis must be placed on the word ‘unfair.’  Unfair prejudice is that quality of evidence which might result in an improper basis for a jury decision.  Consequently, if the evidence arouses the jury’s emotional sympathies, evokes a sense of horror, or appeals to an instinct to punish, the evidence may be unfairly prejudicial.  Usually, although not always, unfairly prejudicial evidence appeals to the jury’s emotions rather than intellect.’”

            Plaintiffs typically evoke the label of “prejudicial” in challenging nearly anything submitted by the defense.  This particular language is helpful inasmuch as the Eleventh District made a academic distinction and analysis as it pertains to what must be presented in order to legally meet the standard associated with exclusion of evidence as “prejudicial.”

            The appellate court concluded that it was appropriate to permit Dr. Maggiano to testify as to this eye/sleep disorder inasmuch as counsel for the plaintiff had “opened the door” and Dr. Maggiano’s testimony aided the plaintiff by virtue of the testimony as to aggravation of a pre-existing condition.  Therefore, the lower court’s allowance of the testimony was affirmed on appeal.

 

Curtin & Associates will continue to electronically transmit cases of interest to the insurance industry.  Please visit our website at http://www.curtinlawfirm.com/.  For your convenience, we will post these cases on our website in the “Newsletter” link.

 

The information contained in this Newsletter is not a legal opinion and is for informational purposes only.  Specific questions should be directed to an attorney for a legal opinion.

Trial Updates

            Curtin & Associates is pleased to review significant jury trials recently completed by our office:

            G. Michael Curtin completed a week long jury trial representing the CEO of a corporation in a lawsuit filed by the former president of the same corporation.  Upon retirement, the outgoing president had argued the CEO failed to make monetary distributions to him sufficient to cover tax liability derivative of his ownership of Sub-chapter S stock in the company.  The demand for resolution was $330,000 and the jury returned an unanimous defense verdict in favor of the CEO.  For privacy considerations, the names of the participants as well as the company have been omitted from this description.

 

Expert Witness – Scope of Testimony

Davis v. Killing, (2007) 171 Ohio App.3d 400:

            The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident wherein plaintiff was traveling west on Route 422 attempting to make a left hand turn and was struck by the defendant who was heading east on Route 422.  The central dispute at issue dealt with who had the green light/green arrow.  The plaintiff presented testimony from her treating physician for the purposes of demonstrating that the motor vehicle accident has worsened her pre-existing multiple sclerosis.  However, testimony was also adduced that the plaintiff had been seen on the day of the accident (prior to the collision) by the same doctor and had described prior episodes of feeling sleepy and having trouble staying awake while talking or driving. 

            The plaintiff objected to this testimony noting that the admission of it would be highly prejudicial.  The court noted in its analysis that the label “prejudicial” is not dispositive of the determination of admissibility.  In paragraphs 15 and 16, the court stated the following:

            “At the outset, we note that the evidence relating to the physical complaints and symptoms appellant had told her treating physician about on the day of the accident (her eye/sleep disorder) must be deemed relevant since these conditions could have potentially affected her vision and driving capabilities.  We must next determine whether such evidence was prejudicial and should have been excluded under Evid.R. 403.

            Appellant argues that the inclusion of this evidence was prejudicial and an abuse of discretion.  However, ‘exclusion on the basis of unfair prejudice involves more than a balance of mere prejudice.  If unfair prejudice simply meant prejudice, anything adverse to a litigant’s case would be excludable under (Evid.R.) 403.  Emphasis must be placed on the word ‘unfair.’  Unfair prejudice is that quality of evidence which might result in an improper basis for a jury decision.  Consequently, if the evidence arouses the jury’s emotional sympathies, evokes a sense of horror, or appeals to an instinct to punish, the evidence may be unfairly prejudicial.  Usually, although not always, unfairly prejudicial evidence appeals to the jury’s emotions rather than intellect.’”

            Plaintiffs typically evoke the label of “prejudicial” in challenging nearly anything submitted by the defense.  This particular language is helpful inasmuch as the Eleventh District made a academic distinction and analysis as it pertains to what must be presented in order to legally meet the standard associated with exclusion of evidence as “prejudicial.”

            The appellate court concluded that it was appropriate to permit Dr. Maggiano to testify as to this eye/sleep disorder inasmuch as counsel for the plaintiff had “opened the door” and Dr. Maggiano’s testimony aided the plaintiff by virtue of the testimony as to aggravation of a pre-existing condition.  Therefore, the lower court’s allowance of the testimony was affirmed on appeal.

 

Curtin & Associates will continue to electronically transmit cases of interest to the insurance industry.  Please visit our website at http://www.curtinlawfirm.com/.  For your convenience, we will post these cases on our website in the “Newsletter” link.

 

The information contained in this Newsletter is not a legal opinion and is for informational purposes only.  Specific questions should be directed to an attorney for a legal opinion.