Jury Verdict Awarding Plaintiff Medical Bills, But Denying Damages For Pain And Suffering, Is Not Against The Manifest Weight Of The Evidence
Uhlir v. State Farm Ins. Co., (2005) 164 Ohio App.3d 71:
In Uhlir v. State Farm Ins. Co., the Eighth District Court of Appeals heard a challenge to a jury verdict which had awarded damages limited to the medical bills. The plaintiffs had originally sought treatment, the day following the accident, at Marymount Hospital, but thereafter a gap in treatment of 38 days existed until such time as Mrs. Uhlir began treatment with a chiropractor. She had previously treated with the same chiropractor for an accident in 1993 and had received nearly 100 treatments from the same chiropractor, all before the accident at issue in the case in review. Mr. Uhlir also sought treatment with the same chiropractor but he, like his wife, had prior treatment with the same chiropractor.
The defense presented a defense chiropractor who indicated that the plaintiff’s chiropractor had over-treated and concluded that, based upon the records, the plaintiffs had been injured as a result of the accident, but not to the extent of the medical bills incurred by both plaintiffs.
The jury awarded Mrs. Uhlir $4,749 and Mr. Uhlir $4,076 which represented the exact amount of their medical expenses. The Uhlirs thereafter filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial or additur. The trial court denied these motions.
The Eighth District Court of Appeals began its analysis by reviewing the statewide treatment associated with jury verdicts awarding medical bills only. In paragraph 19 of its opinion, the court stated the following:
“There is a split among Ohio courts whether damage awards for medical bills for injuries, without any award for pain and suffering, are against the manifest weight of evidence. Some courts conclude that an award for medical damages without an award for pain and suffering automatically results in an award that is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Other courts hold that when the testimony regarding pain and suffering is controverted, the award for medical damages without an award for pain and suffering is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
The Eighth District never clearly resolved which “school of thought” it would be follow. The court noted that there was sufficient evidence in the record to conclude that any pain and suffering experience was modest and, therefore, any pain and suffering experience was unrelated to the accident and, instead, due to pre-existing conditions. The court also commented on events that transpired at the lower court level and seemingly based their opinion, in part, upon the events that occurred at trial. In paragraph 26 of its opinion, the court stated the following:
“In addition, the Uhlirs failed to submit special interrogatories to the jury in order to test the factual basis for the verdict. Therefore, we are unable to ascertain the exact reason the jury chose not to award damages for pain and suffering. We conclude that the jury’s damage awards were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
The case can be read for the proposition that the Eighth Appellate District could very well reach a different result based upon different facts. Accordingly, the foregoing decision is very interesting to review and also includes all of the citations from different districts which have reached differing results on this issue of law.
How Much Is Too Much?
New Trial Ordered Based Upon Statements Of Defense Counsel
Fehrenbach v. O’Malley (2005) 164 Ohio App.3d 80:
In the medical malpractice arena, a reminder exists that a defense attorney’s zeal can sometimes come back to “haunt” him/her as reflected by the decision of Fehrenbach v. O’Malley. The events which partially led to the ordering of a new trial were summarized in paragraph 2 of the syllabus:
“Defense counsel’s improper and inflammatory comments throughout trial, including opening statement and closing arguments, created substantial likelihood that the jury was misled and that verdict was improperly influenced, and thus, new trial was warranted, in medical malpractice action brought by infant’s parents against pediatrician and medical clinic; counsel repeatedly called plaintiffs ‘shameful’ parents who were using their child’s illness and medical complications to ‘collect a $2,000,000 paycheck’ by lying and, with their counsel’s help, ‘trucking’ in ‘alleged’ experts paid ‘$8,000 apiece to say what [they] wanted them to say,’ defense counsel further stated parents had spent seven years reading up on medical journals and books and learning symptoms of meningitis to ‘piece together the case,’ and defense counsel aroused improper sympathy for pediatrician, e.g., by asking for a verdict that would allow pediatrician to ‘continue to practice.’
Post-judgment Interest – Integration Clause
Colon v. Cleveland, (2005) 164 Ohio App.3d 323:
The Eighth District Court of Appeals dealt with an interesting juxtaposition of the issue of post-judgment interest and an integration clause. The case was unique inasmuch as the matter had been settled, but the plaintiff had resisted the City of Cleveland’s request for a confidentiality agreement. Accordingly, time passed and then the matter was further complicated by an issue of whether or not settlement monies could be disbursed to the plaintiff because of alleged arrearage in child support.
In May of 2004, the plaintiff filed a motion with the trial court to enforce the oral settlement agreement and that motion was granted including an order to pay interest. However, the plaintiff thereafter, in September of 2004, signed a release of all claims form which was limited to the original settlement amount of $17,500, but it did include a standard integration clause.
The Eighth District Court of Appeals began its analysis by citation to Layne v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co. 104 Ohio St.3d 509, quoting the following in paragraph 13 of its opinion:
“In Layne, the parties orally agreed to a settlement amount. Two weeks later, the parties signed a written agreement that contained an integration clause. Layne argued that the obligation to pay interest on the settlement was triggered on the settlement date, not the date they signed the release. The court disagreed and held that an integration clause in a written agreement nullifies any prior oral agreement. The court explained:
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to which they have both assented as the complete and accurate integration of that contract, evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing.”
In Colon, supra, the integration clause was nearly identical to the clause in Layne and stated in pertinent part the following at paragraph 14:
“Releasor understand and represents that no promise, inducement, or agreement not expressly stated in this Release has been made to them, and that the Release contains the entire agreement between the parties ...”
The court concluded, in paragraph 19 of its opinion, the following:
“In accordance with Layne, we find that the obligation to pay interest on the settlement was triggered when the parties executed the release of all claims on September 24, 2000 ... Furthermore, we find that the city owes no interest because it tendered the settlement check on the same day the parties signed the release.
Participant In Martial Arts Class Barred From Recovery
Barakat v. Pordash, (2005) 164 Ohio App.3d 328:
The Ohio Supreme Court decision of Marchetti v. Kalish (1990) 53 Ohio St.3d 95 was successfully argued before the Ohio Supreme Court by G. Michael Curtin. The case continues to be controlling law in the State of Ohio and, most recently was applied to a situation wherein summary judgment was entered against a participant who sued his instructor in a martial arts class.
The court summarized the nature of the martial arts class in paragraph 12 of its opinion and stated the following:
“Sambo is a high-contact, inherently dangerous sport. Pordash testified that sambo involves throws, strikes, blows, punching, and other techniques. Thus, physical contact to the body is actually encouraged by the sport. We find that being injured in the course of a hold or maneuver is a risk that is a foreseeable and customary risk of the sport.”
The court reviewed the status of the law in this matter and stated in paragraph 10 of its opinion, the underpinnings of its holding:
The Supreme Court of Ohio has determined that when an individual is a participant in or a spectator at a sport or recreational activity, the individual assumes the inherent risks of the activity and cannot recover for any injury unless it can be shown that the other participant’s actions were either reckless or intentional. (Citations omitted) This rule is premised upon the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk and is based on the rationale that a participant in a sport or recreational activity accepts the inherent risks associated with the sport or activity.”
The information contained in this newsletter is not a legal opinion and is for informational purposes only. Specific questions should be directed to an attorney for a legal opinion.
Jury Verdict Awarding Plaintiff Medical Bills, But Denying Damages For Pain And Suffering, Is Not Against The Manifest Weight Of The Evidence
Uhlir v. State Farm Ins. Co., (2005) 164 Ohio App.3d 71:
In Uhlir v. State Farm Ins. Co., the Eighth District Court of Appeals heard a challenge to a jury verdict which had awarded damages limited to the medical bills. The plaintiffs had originally sought treatment, the day following the accident, at Marymount Hospital, but thereafter a gap in treatment of 38 days existed until such time as Mrs. Uhlir began treatment with a chiropractor. She had previously treated with the same chiropractor for an accident in 1993 and had received nearly 100 treatments from the same chiropractor, all before the accident at issue in the case in review. Mr. Uhlir also sought treatment with the same chiropractor but he, like his wife, had prior treatment with the same chiropractor.
The defense presented a defense chiropractor who indicated that the plaintiff’s chiropractor had over-treated and concluded that, based upon the records, the plaintiffs had been injured as a result of the accident, but not to the extent of the medical bills incurred by both plaintiffs.
The jury awarded Mrs. Uhlir $4,749 and Mr. Uhlir $4,076 which represented the exact amount of their medical expenses. The Uhlirs thereafter filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial or additur. The trial court denied these motions.
The Eighth District Court of Appeals began its analysis by reviewing the statewide treatment associated with jury verdicts awarding medical bills only. In paragraph 19 of its opinion, the court stated the following:
“There is a split among Ohio courts whether damage awards for medical bills for injuries, without any award for pain and suffering, are against the manifest weight of evidence. Some courts conclude that an award for medical damages without an award for pain and suffering automatically results in an award that is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Other courts hold that when the testimony regarding pain and suffering is controverted, the award for medical damages without an award for pain and suffering is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
The Eighth District never clearly resolved which “school of thought” it would be follow. The court noted that there was sufficient evidence in the record to conclude that any pain and suffering experience was modest and, therefore, any pain and suffering experience was unrelated to the accident and, instead, due to pre-existing conditions. The court also commented on events that transpired at the lower court level and seemingly based their opinion, in part, upon the events that occurred at trial. In paragraph 26 of its opinion, the court stated the following:
“In addition, the Uhlirs failed to submit special interrogatories to the jury in order to test the factual basis for the verdict. Therefore, we are unable to ascertain the exact reason the jury chose not to award damages for pain and suffering. We conclude that the jury’s damage awards were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
The case can be read for the proposition that the Eighth Appellate District could very well reach a different result based upon different facts. Accordingly, the foregoing decision is very interesting to review and also includes all of the citations from different districts which have reached differing results on this issue of law.
How Much Is Too Much?
New Trial Ordered Based Upon Statements Of Defense Counsel
Fehrenbach v. O’Malley (2005) 164 Ohio App.3d 80:
In the medical malpractice arena, a reminder exists that a defense attorney’s zeal can sometimes come back to “haunt” him/her as reflected by the decision of Fehrenbach v. O’Malley. The events which partially led to the ordering of a new trial were summarized in paragraph 2 of the syllabus:
“Defense counsel’s improper and inflammatory comments throughout trial, including opening statement and closing arguments, created substantial likelihood that the jury was misled and that verdict was improperly influenced, and thus, new trial was warranted, in medical malpractice action brought by infant’s parents against pediatrician and medical clinic; counsel repeatedly called plaintiffs ‘shameful’ parents who were using their child’s illness and medical complications to ‘collect a $2,000,000 paycheck’ by lying and, with their counsel’s help, ‘trucking’ in ‘alleged’ experts paid ‘$8,000 apiece to say what [they] wanted them to say,’ defense counsel further stated parents had spent seven years reading up on medical journals and books and learning symptoms of meningitis to ‘piece together the case,’ and defense counsel aroused improper sympathy for pediatrician, e.g., by asking for a verdict that would allow pediatrician to ‘continue to practice.’
Post-judgment Interest – Integration Clause
Colon v. Cleveland, (2005) 164 Ohio App.3d 323:
The Eighth District Court of Appeals dealt with an interesting juxtaposition of the issue of post-judgment interest and an integration clause. The case was unique inasmuch as the matter had been settled, but the plaintiff had resisted the City of Cleveland’s request for a confidentiality agreement. Accordingly, time passed and then the matter was further complicated by an issue of whether or not settlement monies could be disbursed to the plaintiff because of alleged arrearage in child support.
In May of 2004, the plaintiff filed a motion with the trial court to enforce the oral settlement agreement and that motion was granted including an order to pay interest. However, the plaintiff thereafter, in September of 2004, signed a release of all claims form which was limited to the original settlement amount of $17,500, but it did include a standard integration clause.
The Eighth District Court of Appeals began its analysis by citation to Layne v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co. 104 Ohio St.3d 509, quoting the following in paragraph 13 of its opinion:
“In Layne, the parties orally agreed to a settlement amount. Two weeks later, the parties signed a written agreement that contained an integration clause. Layne argued that the obligation to pay interest on the settlement was triggered on the settlement date, not the date they signed the release. The court disagreed and held that an integration clause in a written agreement nullifies any prior oral agreement. The court explained:
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to which they have both assented as the complete and accurate integration of that contract, evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing.”
In Colon, supra, the integration clause was nearly identical to the clause in Layne and stated in pertinent part the following at paragraph 14:
“Releasor understand and represents that no promise, inducement, or agreement not expressly stated in this Release has been made to them, and that the Release contains the entire agreement between the parties ...”
The court concluded, in paragraph 19 of its opinion, the following:
“In accordance with Layne, we find that the obligation to pay interest on the settlement was triggered when the parties executed the release of all claims on September 24, 2000 ... Furthermore, we find that the city owes no interest because it tendered the settlement check on the same day the parties signed the release.
Participant In Martial Arts Class Barred From Recovery
Barakat v. Pordash, (2005) 164 Ohio App.3d 328:
The Ohio Supreme Court decision of Marchetti v. Kalish (1990) 53 Ohio St.3d 95 was successfully argued before the Ohio Supreme Court by G. Michael Curtin. The case continues to be controlling law in the State of Ohio and, most recently was applied to a situation wherein summary judgment was entered against a participant who sued his instructor in a martial arts class.
The court summarized the nature of the martial arts class in paragraph 12 of its opinion and stated the following:
“Sambo is a high-contact, inherently dangerous sport. Pordash testified that sambo involves throws, strikes, blows, punching, and other techniques. Thus, physical contact to the body is actually encouraged by the sport. We find that being injured in the course of a hold or maneuver is a risk that is a foreseeable and customary risk of the sport.”
The court reviewed the status of the law in this matter and stated in paragraph 10 of its opinion, the underpinnings of its holding:
The Supreme Court of Ohio has determined that when an individual is a participant in or a spectator at a sport or recreational activity, the individual assumes the inherent risks of the activity and cannot recover for any injury unless it can be shown that the other participant’s actions were either reckless or intentional. (Citations omitted) This rule is premised upon the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk and is based on the rationale that a participant in a sport or recreational activity accepts the inherent risks associated with the sport or activity.”
The information contained in this newsletter is not a legal opinion and is for informational purposes only. Specific questions should be directed to an attorney for a legal opinion.