Open and Obvious Doctrine/Collateral Source Rule
Robinson v. Bates, (2005) 160 Ohio App.3d 668:
Judge Painter of the First District Court of Appeals authored an opinion dealing with two major legal concepts, specifically the open-and-obvious doctrine in conjunction with the collateral source rule. The opinion embraces several nuances oftentimes never reviewed and, for that purpose, this opinion is worthy of discussion and analysis in the newsletter.
A tenant had been injured on the landlord’s premises as a result of repair work being done to a driveway. A directed verdict had been granted in favor of the landlord based upon the open-and-obvious doctrine in light of the fact that the tenant was aware of the condition of the driveway. In its reversal, the court stated in paragraphs 14-15 of its opinion, the following:
“In urging us to affirm the trial court’s directed verdict, Bates points out that Robinson was well aware of the jagged concrete slab because she had passed it for several days while getting in and out of her car. Bates argues that under the open-and-obvious doctrine, she owed no duty to warn Robinson or even to remedy the dangerous condition.
But open-and-obvious is a common-law doctrine that cannot relieve a landlord of statutory duties. As the Ohio Supreme Court made clear in Armstrong v. Best Buy, the open-and-obvious doctrine concerns only whether a duty exists. It does not go to causation or any other element of negligence. It can act as a bar only to a landowner’s duty. But the duty that Robinson claims Bates breached was a statutory duty. There can be no debate about whether this duty existed – it is written in the Revised Code.”
On that basis, the appellate court reversed the granting of a directed verdict in favor of the landlord.
As it pertains to the issue of collateral source, the court also reviewed a situation wherein the tenant’s total medical bills were in the amount of $1,919, but the tenant’s insurance company had settled the medical bill claim for $1,350. The trial court refused to admit all the medical bills reasoning that the lesser amount paid by the insurance company was the only amount the jury could consider for damages.
In his opinion, Judge Painter stated in paragraphs 30, 36, 38 and 44 the following:
“No Ohio court has addressed the issue whether plaintiffs are entitled to recover the full amount of their medical costs or may seek only the amount paid by their insurance. But many other state and federal courts have.
…
In Ohio, a plaintiff who has been injured by the tortious conduct of another may recover the reasonable value of medical services rendered. The touchstone of the plaintiff’s recovery is the reasonable value of the services rendered, not the actual charge or the cost incurred for those services.
...
Even medical services rendered gratuitously would not prevent a plaintiff from recovering the value of those services as part of his or her compensatory damages. The Restatement explains, for example, that ‘the fact that the doctor did not charge for his services or the plaintiff was treated in a veterans hospital does not prevent his recovery for the reasonable value of the service ...’”
In ruling that the plaintiff could recover the total amount of medical bills of $1,919, the court stated the following:
“We think this analysis is the fairest approach to the plaintiff-victim and also supports the public-policy purposes of the collateral-source rule. As stated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, ‘The collateral source rule prevents payments made by the insured from inuring to the benefit of the defendant, and the insurer’s subrogation rights prevent a double recovery on the part of the plaintiff.’”
It is anticipated that the plaintiff’s bar will likely attempt to advance reasoning of the type utilized by Judge Painter in his opinion. Curtin & Associates, LLP continues to analyze and discuss cases that are advantageous to the defense bar as well as assess cases that could be used by the plaintiff’s bar in litigation
Choice of Law - Underinsured Motorist Coverage
Byer v. Wright (2005) 160 Ohio App.3d 472:
The Eleventh District Court of Appeals dealt with the situation wherein a question arose as to which state’s law applied to an underinsured motorist policy. This is a topic that often is raised with Curtin & Associates, LLP and, accordingly, the case is instructive as it relates to that topic.
In paragraphs 19 and 20 of its opinion, the court stated the following:
“Section 188 (of the Restatement of the Law 2d, Conflict of Laws) provides that when the contracting parties have not made an effective choice of law, their rights and duties under the contract are determined by the law of the state that, with respect to that issue, has ‘the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties.’ (citation omitted) To make this determination, ‘Section 188(2)(a) through (d) more specifically provides that courts should consider the place of contracting, the place of negotiation, the place of performance, the location of the subject matter, and the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties.’
In automobile-insurance cases, application of these factors will often correspond with the Restatement’s view that rights created under an insurance contract should be determined by the law of the state the parties understood was to be the place where the insured vehicles were principally garaged or registered, unless with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship to the transaction and the parties.”
Former Version of R.C. 3937 .18(K)(2) Does Not Violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions
Morris v. United Ohio Insurance Company (2005), 160 Ohio App.3d 663, 2005-Ohio-2025:
In February, 2000, Richard Morris was driving a motor home when he rear-ended a semi-truck. Richard’s wife, Wanda Morris, was a passenger in the motor home at the time of the accident who suffered various injuries from the accident. Initially, Mrs. Morris attempted to recover under the liability portion of her automobile insurance policy, but coverage was denied under the exclusion of liability portion of the policy. Subsequently, Mrs. Morris attempted to recover under the UM/UIM portion of the same policy and again coverage was denied. The pertinent portion of the policy stated:
“E. With regard to definition C., uninsured motor vehicle does not include any vehicle or equipment:
1. Owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family member.”
This policy language was taken from R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) which provided that an uninsured motor vehicle did not include a vehicle “owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family member.” When UM/UIM coverage was denied under this portion of the policy, Mrs. Morris brought suit challenging the constitutionality of R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, she argued that this language discriminates against claimants who are related to the tortfeasor and that there was no rational basis for this discrimination.
The Fourth District Court of Appeals concluded that R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) did not violate the Equal Protection Clause as its focus was not on the class of person’s driving at the time of the accident, but rather on the vehicle involved in the accident. The Court stated, “It is (the) tortfeasor’s vehicle, not his identity, that determines whether (K)(2) applies. If the tortfeasor is driving a vehicle owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of a named insured or his or her family members, then (K)(2) will preclude coverage. If, on the other hand, the tortfeasor is driving a different vehicle (a vehicle that is not owned by a named insured or family member of a named insured), then (K)(2) will not preclude coverage.”
The information contained in this newsletter is not a legal opinion and is for informational purposes only. Specific questions should be directed to an attorney for a legal opinion.
Open and Obvious Doctrine/Collateral Source Rule
Robinson v. Bates, (2005) 160 Ohio App.3d 668:
Judge Painter of the First District Court of Appeals authored an opinion dealing with two major legal concepts, specifically the open-and-obvious doctrine in conjunction with the collateral source rule. The opinion embraces several nuances oftentimes never reviewed and, for that purpose, this opinion is worthy of discussion and analysis in the newsletter.
A tenant had been injured on the landlord’s premises as a result of repair work being done to a driveway. A directed verdict had been granted in favor of the landlord based upon the open-and-obvious doctrine in light of the fact that the tenant was aware of the condition of the driveway. In its reversal, the court stated in paragraphs 14-15 of its opinion, the following:
“In urging us to affirm the trial court’s directed verdict, Bates points out that Robinson was well aware of the jagged concrete slab because she had passed it for several days while getting in and out of her car. Bates argues that under the open-and-obvious doctrine, she owed no duty to warn Robinson or even to remedy the dangerous condition.
But open-and-obvious is a common-law doctrine that cannot relieve a landlord of statutory duties. As the Ohio Supreme Court made clear in Armstrong v. Best Buy, the open-and-obvious doctrine concerns only whether a duty exists. It does not go to causation or any other element of negligence. It can act as a bar only to a landowner’s duty. But the duty that Robinson claims Bates breached was a statutory duty. There can be no debate about whether this duty existed – it is written in the Revised Code.”
On that basis, the appellate court reversed the granting of a directed verdict in favor of the landlord.
As it pertains to the issue of collateral source, the court also reviewed a situation wherein the tenant’s total medical bills were in the amount of $1,919, but the tenant’s insurance company had settled the medical bill claim for $1,350. The trial court refused to admit all the medical bills reasoning that the lesser amount paid by the insurance company was the only amount the jury could consider for damages.
In his opinion, Judge Painter stated in paragraphs 30, 36, 38 and 44 the following:
“No Ohio court has addressed the issue whether plaintiffs are entitled to recover the full amount of their medical costs or may seek only the amount paid by their insurance. But many other state and federal courts have.
…
In Ohio, a plaintiff who has been injured by the tortious conduct of another may recover the reasonable value of medical services rendered. The touchstone of the plaintiff’s recovery is the reasonable value of the services rendered, not the actual charge or the cost incurred for those services.
...
Even medical services rendered gratuitously would not prevent a plaintiff from recovering the value of those services as part of his or her compensatory damages. The Restatement explains, for example, that ‘the fact that the doctor did not charge for his services or the plaintiff was treated in a veterans hospital does not prevent his recovery for the reasonable value of the service ...’”
In ruling that the plaintiff could recover the total amount of medical bills of $1,919, the court stated the following:
“We think this analysis is the fairest approach to the plaintiff-victim and also supports the public-policy purposes of the collateral-source rule. As stated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, ‘The collateral source rule prevents payments made by the insured from inuring to the benefit of the defendant, and the insurer’s subrogation rights prevent a double recovery on the part of the plaintiff.’”
It is anticipated that the plaintiff’s bar will likely attempt to advance reasoning of the type utilized by Judge Painter in his opinion. Curtin & Associates, LLP continues to analyze and discuss cases that are advantageous to the defense bar as well as assess cases that could be used by the plaintiff’s bar in litigation
Choice of Law - Underinsured Motorist Coverage
Byer v. Wright (2005) 160 Ohio App.3d 472:
The Eleventh District Court of Appeals dealt with the situation wherein a question arose as to which state’s law applied to an underinsured motorist policy. This is a topic that often is raised with Curtin & Associates, LLP and, accordingly, the case is instructive as it relates to that topic.
In paragraphs 19 and 20 of its opinion, the court stated the following:
“Section 188 (of the Restatement of the Law 2d, Conflict of Laws) provides that when the contracting parties have not made an effective choice of law, their rights and duties under the contract are determined by the law of the state that, with respect to that issue, has ‘the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties.’ (citation omitted) To make this determination, ‘Section 188(2)(a) through (d) more specifically provides that courts should consider the place of contracting, the place of negotiation, the place of performance, the location of the subject matter, and the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties.’
In automobile-insurance cases, application of these factors will often correspond with the Restatement’s view that rights created under an insurance contract should be determined by the law of the state the parties understood was to be the place where the insured vehicles were principally garaged or registered, unless with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship to the transaction and the parties.”
Former Version of R.C. 3937 .18(K)(2) Does Not Violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions
Morris v. United Ohio Insurance Company (2005), 160 Ohio App.3d 663, 2005-Ohio-2025:
In February, 2000, Richard Morris was driving a motor home when he rear-ended a semi-truck. Richard’s wife, Wanda Morris, was a passenger in the motor home at the time of the accident who suffered various injuries from the accident. Initially, Mrs. Morris attempted to recover under the liability portion of her automobile insurance policy, but coverage was denied under the exclusion of liability portion of the policy. Subsequently, Mrs. Morris attempted to recover under the UM/UIM portion of the same policy and again coverage was denied. The pertinent portion of the policy stated:
“E. With regard to definition C., uninsured motor vehicle does not include any vehicle or equipment:
1. Owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family member.”
This policy language was taken from R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) which provided that an uninsured motor vehicle did not include a vehicle “owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family member.” When UM/UIM coverage was denied under this portion of the policy, Mrs. Morris brought suit challenging the constitutionality of R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, she argued that this language discriminates against claimants who are related to the tortfeasor and that there was no rational basis for this discrimination.
The Fourth District Court of Appeals concluded that R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) did not violate the Equal Protection Clause as its focus was not on the class of person’s driving at the time of the accident, but rather on the vehicle involved in the accident. The Court stated, “It is (the) tortfeasor’s vehicle, not his identity, that determines whether (K)(2) applies. If the tortfeasor is driving a vehicle owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of a named insured or his or her family members, then (K)(2) will preclude coverage. If, on the other hand, the tortfeasor is driving a different vehicle (a vehicle that is not owned by a named insured or family member of a named insured), then (K)(2) will not preclude coverage.”
The information contained in this newsletter is not a legal opinion and is for informational purposes only. Specific questions should be directed to an attorney for a legal opinion.