Nonuse of Seat Belt – Limited Availability as a Defense –
Ruling on Motion in Limine does not Preserve the Issue for Appeal
Gable v. Gates Mills, (2004) 103 Ohio St.3d 449
In Gable v. Gates Mills, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the lower court thereby reinstating a verdict in favor of Daimler Chrysler. The case is noteworthy for the discussion dealing with the seat belt defense as well as the legal effect of a motion in limine.
As pertains to the issue of a seat belt defense, the Court stated the following in its syllabus:
“1. Pursuant to Ohio’s mandatory seatbelt statute, as a general rule, the failure of a person to have worn a seat belt, in violation of the statute, may not be considered or used as evidence of negligence or contributory negligence, may not diminish recovery for damages in any civil action involving the person, and is not admissible as evidence in any civil or criminal action involving the person other than a prosecution for a violation of R.C. 4513.263.
2. R.C. 4513.263(F)(2) provides an exception to the general rule established in R.C. 4513.263(F)(1) against admissibility of seat belt nonuse: Consistent with the Rules of Evidence, the fact that a person was not wearing a seat belt is admissible in evidence in relation to any claim for damages against a manufacturer, designer, distributor, or seller of a passenger car asserting that injury or death was enhanced or aggravated by some design defect in a passenger car or that a passenger car was not crashworthy.”
The Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed the proposition that in order to argue, on appeal, the trial court’s ruling as it pertains to a motion in limine, counsel must interpose an objection at trial to the evidence which is the subject matter of the motion in limine. The ruling on the motion in limine alone will not preserve the issue for appeal. On page 456 of its opinion, the Court stated the following:
“Ohio law is clear, however, that a ruling on a motion in limine may not be appealed and that objections to the introduction of testimony or statements of counsel must be made during the trial to preserve evidentiary rulings for appellate review.
Whistleblower Statute/Promissory Estoppel as Basis
for Wrongful Termination Claim
Hale v. Volunteers of America (2004), 158 Ohio App.3d 415
In Hale v. Volunteers of America, the First District Court of Appeals reviewed the granting of summary judgment in favor of the favor of the Volunteers of America on claims for wrongful discharge and promissory estoppel asserted by former employees, Diana Hale and Carrol Sue Becker. Both of the plaintiffs had a history of registering objections with regard to Volunteers of America’s administration and policies at treatment centers wherein both plaintiffs worked. Subsequent to their termination, both individuals asserted wrongful termination claims predicated upon the Whistleblower’s Statute and promissory estoppel.
The Court began its analysis by reviewing the status of Ohio law in the context of an employer/employee setting and stated on page 423 of its opinion, the following:
“Under Ohio law, at-will employees may be discharged by their employer for any reason, or no reason at all, provided that their termination is not contrary to public policy. “’Clear public policy’ sufficient to justify an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is not limited to public policy expressed by the General Assembly in the form of statutory enactments, but may also be discerned as a matter of law based on other sources, such as the Constitutions of Ohio and the United States, administrative rules and regulations, and the common law.”
The Court summarized the theory advanced by the plaintiffs on page 424 of its opinion and stated the following:
“Hale and Becker contend they were terminated because they voiced concerns about the operation of the Pogue Center, which they believed involved violations of both Ohio law and the VOA’s obligations to provide suitable housing and treatment for its residents ...”
However, the Court rejected a claim predicated upon the Whistleblower Statute and stated on page 425 of its opinion, the following:
“In this case, Hale and Becker did not plead a whistleblower claim under R.C. 4113.52. Likewise, they do not contend that they strictly complied with the whistleblower statute. Rather, they claim that they set forth an independent basis for their public-policy claims.”
The Court concluded its opinion by finding that although the Whistleblower Statute may, in certain situations, give rise to a cause of action by a terminated employee, the plaintiffs herein have failed to meet that standard.
As it relates to the second theory of liability dealing with promissory estoppel, the Court summarized this theory and stated the following on page 429 of its opinion:
“Promissory estoppel is a separate and independent exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. In order to prevail on a claim of promissory estoppel, Hale and Becker had to show (1) a promise, clear and unambiguous in its terms, (2) their reliance upon the promise, (3) that their reliance was reasonable and foreseeable, and (4) that they were injured by their reliance. The second and third elements are generally questions of fact for a jury to resolve.”
The Court affirmed the granting of summary judgment finding that the elements of promissory estoppel had not been satisfied.
Frivolous-Conduct - Award of Attorneys' Fees
Stohlmann v. Hall (2004), 158 Ohio App.3d 499
In Stohlmann v. Hall, the Eighth District Court of Appeals review the standard associated with a court’s ability to award attorneys’ fees in the instances of frivolous conduct. The Court stated in paragraphs 2 and 3 of its syllabus, the following:
“2. While frivolous-conduct statute provides for award of attorney fees as lone remedy for those adversely affected by such conduct, a party is not necessarily or presumptively “adversely affected” based solely upon the fundamental necessity to expend attorney fees to defend a lawsuit in general.
3. Where a determination has been made that a certain claim or claims, or a defense or defenses asserted in a civil action, were frivolous, the party seeking attorney fees under frivolous-conduct statute must affirmatively demonstrate that he or she incurred additional attorney fees as a direct, identifiable result of defending the frivolous conduct in particular.”
The Court noted on page 503, the followng:
“... New World does not challenge the common pleas court’s decision that the only frivolous conduct in this case occurred when plaintiffs’ counsel filed claims that were not warranted by existing law and that were dismissed on New World’s motion. This conduct sets the parameters for the court’s award.”
The Court upheld the trial court’s decision to limit the attorney fees awarded against the plaintiff to the amount of $2,000.
The information contained in this newsletter is not a legal opinion and is for informational purposes only. Specific questions should be directed to an attorney for a legal opinion.
Nonuse of Seat Belt – Limited Availability as a Defense –
Ruling on Motion in Limine does not Preserve the Issue for Appeal
Gable v. Gates Mills, (2004) 103 Ohio St.3d 449
In Gable v. Gates Mills, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the lower court thereby reinstating a verdict in favor of Daimler Chrysler. The case is noteworthy for the discussion dealing with the seat belt defense as well as the legal effect of a motion in limine.
As pertains to the issue of a seat belt defense, the Court stated the following in its syllabus:
“1. Pursuant to Ohio’s mandatory seatbelt statute, as a general rule, the failure of a person to have worn a seat belt, in violation of the statute, may not be considered or used as evidence of negligence or contributory negligence, may not diminish recovery for damages in any civil action involving the person, and is not admissible as evidence in any civil or criminal action involving the person other than a prosecution for a violation of R.C. 4513.263.
2. R.C. 4513.263(F)(2) provides an exception to the general rule established in R.C. 4513.263(F)(1) against admissibility of seat belt nonuse: Consistent with the Rules of Evidence, the fact that a person was not wearing a seat belt is admissible in evidence in relation to any claim for damages against a manufacturer, designer, distributor, or seller of a passenger car asserting that injury or death was enhanced or aggravated by some design defect in a passenger car or that a passenger car was not crashworthy.”
The Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed the proposition that in order to argue, on appeal, the trial court’s ruling as it pertains to a motion in limine, counsel must interpose an objection at trial to the evidence which is the subject matter of the motion in limine. The ruling on the motion in limine alone will not preserve the issue for appeal. On page 456 of its opinion, the Court stated the following:
“Ohio law is clear, however, that a ruling on a motion in limine may not be appealed and that objections to the introduction of testimony or statements of counsel must be made during the trial to preserve evidentiary rulings for appellate review.
Whistleblower Statute/Promissory Estoppel as Basis
for Wrongful Termination Claim
Hale v. Volunteers of America (2004), 158 Ohio App.3d 415
In Hale v. Volunteers of America, the First District Court of Appeals reviewed the granting of summary judgment in favor of the favor of the Volunteers of America on claims for wrongful discharge and promissory estoppel asserted by former employees, Diana Hale and Carrol Sue Becker. Both of the plaintiffs had a history of registering objections with regard to Volunteers of America’s administration and policies at treatment centers wherein both plaintiffs worked. Subsequent to their termination, both individuals asserted wrongful termination claims predicated upon the Whistleblower’s Statute and promissory estoppel.
The Court began its analysis by reviewing the status of Ohio law in the context of an employer/employee setting and stated on page 423 of its opinion, the following:
“Under Ohio law, at-will employees may be discharged by their employer for any reason, or no reason at all, provided that their termination is not contrary to public policy. “’Clear public policy’ sufficient to justify an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is not limited to public policy expressed by the General Assembly in the form of statutory enactments, but may also be discerned as a matter of law based on other sources, such as the Constitutions of Ohio and the United States, administrative rules and regulations, and the common law.”
The Court summarized the theory advanced by the plaintiffs on page 424 of its opinion and stated the following:
“Hale and Becker contend they were terminated because they voiced concerns about the operation of the Pogue Center, which they believed involved violations of both Ohio law and the VOA’s obligations to provide suitable housing and treatment for its residents ...”
However, the Court rejected a claim predicated upon the Whistleblower Statute and stated on page 425 of its opinion, the following:
“In this case, Hale and Becker did not plead a whistleblower claim under R.C. 4113.52. Likewise, they do not contend that they strictly complied with the whistleblower statute. Rather, they claim that they set forth an independent basis for their public-policy claims.”
The Court concluded its opinion by finding that although the Whistleblower Statute may, in certain situations, give rise to a cause of action by a terminated employee, the plaintiffs herein have failed to meet that standard.
As it relates to the second theory of liability dealing with promissory estoppel, the Court summarized this theory and stated the following on page 429 of its opinion:
“Promissory estoppel is a separate and independent exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. In order to prevail on a claim of promissory estoppel, Hale and Becker had to show (1) a promise, clear and unambiguous in its terms, (2) their reliance upon the promise, (3) that their reliance was reasonable and foreseeable, and (4) that they were injured by their reliance. The second and third elements are generally questions of fact for a jury to resolve.”
The Court affirmed the granting of summary judgment finding that the elements of promissory estoppel had not been satisfied.
Frivolous-Conduct - Award of Attorneys' Fees
Stohlmann v. Hall (2004), 158 Ohio App.3d 499
In Stohlmann v. Hall, the Eighth District Court of Appeals review the standard associated with a court’s ability to award attorneys’ fees in the instances of frivolous conduct. The Court stated in paragraphs 2 and 3 of its syllabus, the following:
“2. While frivolous-conduct statute provides for award of attorney fees as lone remedy for those adversely affected by such conduct, a party is not necessarily or presumptively “adversely affected” based solely upon the fundamental necessity to expend attorney fees to defend a lawsuit in general.
3. Where a determination has been made that a certain claim or claims, or a defense or defenses asserted in a civil action, were frivolous, the party seeking attorney fees under frivolous-conduct statute must affirmatively demonstrate that he or she incurred additional attorney fees as a direct, identifiable result of defending the frivolous conduct in particular.”
The Court noted on page 503, the followng:
“... New World does not challenge the common pleas court’s decision that the only frivolous conduct in this case occurred when plaintiffs’ counsel filed claims that were not warranted by existing law and that were dismissed on New World’s motion. This conduct sets the parameters for the court’s award.”
The Court upheld the trial court’s decision to limit the attorney fees awarded against the plaintiff to the amount of $2,000.
The information contained in this newsletter is not a legal opinion and is for informational purposes only. Specific questions should be directed to an attorney for a legal opinion.